Social Status and Peer-Punishment: Findings from Two Road Traffic Field Experiments by Jann, Ben & Coutts, Elisabeth
Ben Jann and Elisabeth Coutts
Social Status and Peer-Punishment: Findings
from Two Road Traffic Field Experiments
Abstract: In a seminal experiment, Doob and Gross (1968) examined the inﬂuence of
social status on peer-punishment of norm violations in traffic. They observed an in-
verse relationship between the economic status indicated by a car that was blocking
an intersection and the punishment meted out to the driver of that car, with “punish-
ment” taking the form of a honk of the car horn. In a more recent experiment, Diek-
mann et al. (1996) noted the status and reactions of the cars blocked by a single mid-
status car. Blocked drivers at the wheel of a higher-status car were found to punish
more aggressively than drivers of a lower-status car. Our study employs a combined
design to separate the effects of driver and blocker status. In two ﬁeld experiments,
we varied the status of the norm-violating car and recorded the status of the blocked
driver’s (i.e., the experimental subject’s) car. Our results provide evidence that social
distance facilitates peer-punishment. Punishment was expressed less readily when
the blocked and blocking cars indicated a similar social status.
1 Introduction
Various studies have examined the relationship between socioeconomic status and
the peer-sanctioning of norm violations (such as unnecessarily blocking the way) in
road traffic. Most of these have focused on the effect of the status of only one of the
parties, either that of the norm violator or that of the punisher. In a seminal study
examining the effect of the norm violator’s status, Doob and Gross (1968) measured
horn-honking response times as an indicator of drivers’ aggression in response to be-
ing blocked by an experimental car at traffic lights in the United States. Two differ-
ent blocking cars were used, each indicating a different social status. As response
timeswere signiﬁcantly shorter, and responses occurred signiﬁcantlymore frequently,
when a driver was frustrated (i.e., blocked) by an automobile indicating lower status,
Doob andGross concluded that the presumable social status of the blockingdriver and
aggression expressed toward that blocking driver are inversely related. Deaux (1971)
found a similar yet non-signiﬁcant effect in one roughly contemporaneous replication
Note:We are indebted to RenatoMarioni and Stephan Suhner (Experiment 1), and to Jörg Rothe, Heiko
Schmiedeskamp,Hélène Venningen, Jelena Curcic, and JakubSwiech (Experiment 2), for their support
in designing the experiments, conducting the ﬁeldwork, and/or preparing the data. We thank BMW
(Schweiz) AG for providing a vehicle (free of charge) for Experiment 2. Experiment 1 has also been
reported in Jann, Suhner, andMarioni (1995) and in Jann (2009); Experiment 2 has also been reported
in Rothe and Schmiederkamp (2006).
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of the experiment in the U.S., but Chase and Mills (1973) found the opposite effect in
another such replication. The effect reported by Doob and Gross was, however, re-
cently replicated in a Japanese study that found longer honking latencies in response
to being blocked by a high-status car than a low-status car, as long as the car did
not display a beginning driver’s plate (Yazawa 2004). Finally, drivers in a study by
McGarva and Steiner (2000) responded more aggressively to provocation from a low-
status driver than from a high-status driver.
Other studies have instead looked at the effect of the blocked driver’s status on a
honking response. For example, Diekmann et al. (1996) also blocked drivers at traffic
lights (in Germany) and recorded horn-honking response times, but held the status
of the blocking car constant while measuring the status indicated by the blocked car
(containing the potential punisher). Diekmann et al. found a positive relationship be-
tween the status of the driver and the degree of aggression he or she displayed toward
the driver of the blocking car (with the exception of the lowest class drivers, who acted
fairly aggressively as well).
Results from such horn-honking studies are traditionally discussed in the context
of theories of aggressive behavior. The idea is that being blocked causes frustration
and anger on the side of the blocked driver (Baron 1976; Lajunen and Parker 2001;
Lajunen, Parker, and Stradling 1998; Lawton and Nutter 2002), who may then react
with responses such as horn honking, obscene gestures, ﬂashing high beams, or tail-
gating (Hennessy and Wiesenthal 1997; Parker, Lajunen, and Summala 2002; Turner,
Layton, and Simons 1975). Whether such behavior is shown depends on both the ag-
gressor’s traits and the situation in which the aggression occurs (for a correspond-
ing general aggression model, see Anderson and Bushman 2002; for a similar model
applying speciﬁcally to driver behavior, see Shinar 1998). A distinction is also made
between hostile aggression as an impulsive response intended to harm a victim, and
instrumental aggression, which is a premeditated action used as a means to achieve
some goal other than harming a victim (Anderson and Bushman 2002:29). Although
drivers who engage in horn honking are also likely to engage in other forms of mild
aggression (Novaco 1991; Shinar 1998) and horn-honking behavior varies according
to factors that have been observed to promote aggressive responses in general (such
as uncomfortably hot temperatures, stressful circumstances, or increased anonymity:
see Baron 1976; Kenrick and MacFarlane 1986; Hennessy and Wiesenthal 1999; Elli-
son et al. 1995), it seems obvious that honking often has an instrumental component,
that is, the attempt to motivate the blocker to move his or her car. However, whether
honking represents an expression of hostile or of instrumental aggression (which can
be difficult to separate, as is pointed out by various authors: see Doob and Gross 1968;
McGarva and Steiner 2000; Shinar 1998), there is reason to believe that drivers blocked
at an intersection by an experimental car will ﬁnd the experience frustrating and are
likely to retaliate by honking their own car horns.
An explanation forwhyblocked drivers honk their horn is that the frustrating situ-
ationmakes them angry. Anger has been deﬁned as an attempt to adjust social behav-
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ior when someone else has violated rules or norms. It is an emotional state that often
results in aggressive behavior, and may indeed be associated with aggressive behav-
ior while driving (Lawton and Nutter 2002). There are, however, differences between
people in terms of their disposition toward becoming angry, both in general (Pitkänen
1973; Verona, Patrick, and Lang 2002) and in response to frustrations on the road (Def-
fenbacher et al. 2001; Deffenbacher, Oetting, and Lynch 1994; McGarva and Steiner
2000; Yagil 2001). Anger is expressed less often than it is experienced, bothwhile driv-
ing (Lajunen and Parker 2001) and in general (Ramirez, Santisteban, Fujihara, and
Van Goozen 2002). One factor thought to inﬂuence the experience and the expression
of anger is the social status of the angered person. Various theorists have discussed the
role of emotional expression and suppression in establishing and maintaining social
hierarchies (Clark 1990; Keltner, Gruenfeld, andAnderson 2003; Kemper 1978; Kemper
1987; Lovaglia and Houser 1996; McKinnon 1994; Ridgeway and Johnson 1990; Smith-
Lovin 1990), predicting that those who occupy higher status positions will experience
less negative affect than those of lower status and will also express any anger they
experience more freely. There is some empirical evidence that this is the case. Using
broad-based population samples, Haukkala (2002) and Schieman (2003) found either
no SES-related differences in trait anger (Haukkala) or less anger in higher economic
classes (Schieman). However, both authors found that anger, when experienced, was
more likely to be expressed by those with better education or higher income. Other
studies have found similar effects on the expression of anger in the workplace, with
those of higher occupational status more likely to express their anger than those of a
lower occupational status, although those with lower status often report experiencing
more anger at work (Lively 2000; Sloan 2004).¹
These results correspond with those showing a better ﬁt between emotion and
behavior (or less inhibited behavior) in high-status individuals, whether that higher
status occurs naturally or has been experimentally produced (Anderson and Berdahl
2002; Hecht and LaFrance 1988; Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson 2003). One study
(Galinsky, Gruenfeld, and Magee 2003) artiﬁcially varied the status of subjects within
their experimental groups, and found that participants of greater status were quicker
to stop an irritating noise than those of lesser status. The proneness of high-status in-
dividuals to act in accordance with their emotions or wishes may also be reﬂected in
more insistent driving techniques. For example, Taubman-Ben-Ari, Mikulincer, and
Gillath (2004) found that placing high value on a driving style that reﬂected behav-
iors such as honking and ﬂashing high beams at other drivers (“angry driving”) was
positively associated with higher scores on Burger and Cooper’s (1979) Desirability
for Control scale. In other words, those who agreed with statements such as “I would
1 There is evidence that anger expression differs by social group, and also that people use the emotion
expressed in a reaction to a trying or frustrating situation as a cue to an actor’s social status. A higher
status is ascribed to the person with the angry reaction (Conway, DiFazio, and Mayman 1999: Study 2;
Tiedens 2001; Tiedens, Ellsworth, and Mesquita 2000).
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prefer to be a leader than a follower” and disagreed with statements such as “Oth-
ers usually know what is best for me” also reported more honking and light-ﬂashing
behavior while driving.
There is, however, reason to believe that the relevant determinant of the expres-
sion of anger or irritation is less the status of the angered person than the difference
in status between the angered person and the person who angered him or her. Some
empirical evidence indicates that aggression “ﬂows downward” in the status chain.
For instance, subjects in Kuppens, Van Mechelen and Meulders’ (2004) experiment
reported being more likely to express anger toward a target of lower relative status
than toward one of higher relative status, a result also obtained by Allan and Gilbert
(2002). Using a probability sample of the U.S. population, Sloan (2004) found that
workersweremore likely to express anger toward their subordinates than toward their
supervisors. Such results are also consistent with evidence from various animal stud-
ies on the establishment and maintenance of social hierarchies, in which aggression
is found to ﬂow downward (Barroso, Alados, and Boza 2000).
Alternatively, sanctioning behavior in road trafficmay reﬂect a more general phe-
nomenonof lower intra-group aggression or higher inter-group aggression. Onemech-
anism for such an effect is a greater willingness to cooperate and a reduced propen-
sity to aggress against actors whom one perceives as belonging to the same group. Re-
searchon social categorizationand inter-groupbehavior (Billig andTajfel 1973; Brewer
andKramer 1985;Mummendey and Schreiber 1983; Robinson 1996; Tajfel 1982a; Tajfel
1978; Tajfel 1982b; Tajfel et al. 1971; Turner, Brown, and Tajfel 1979) has revealed a
strong bias toward favoring the in-group in many contexts – importantly, even “[. . . ]
in theabsenceof comparisonwithanyother groups” (Brewer 1979:321; also seeKramer
and Brewer 1986). In-group favoritism implies that aggression “ﬂows outward”.
There are also arguments for the reverse effect: that is, that aggression “ﬂows in-
ward”. Gould (2003) argues that conﬂict occurs less often in relationships in which
there is a clear hierarchy than in “symmetrical relationships”. The reason is that peo-
ple have a strong tendency to battle out a ranking if their positions are ambiguous due
to the lack of an established hierarchy.
Whichever of thesehypotheses applies, if thepunishingbehavior canbepredicted
from the difference in status between two parties to a conﬂict, previous studies on
horn-honking responses have examined only one half of the equation. Some, such as
the study conducted by Doob and Gross (1968), found that low-status blocking cars
elicited faster reactions and thus higher levels of sanctioning than high-status block-
ing cars. Studies such as the one from Diekmann et al. (1996) report that high-status
drivers reactedmore quickly to having their progress impeded than low-status drivers.
In the current study, we investigate a possible interaction effect between the status
of the blocker and the status of the frustrated driver. We assume that the disparity
between the statuses of the actors (rather than the status of one or the other per se)
determines the aggressiveness displayed in the blocked-intersection situation.
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With respect to the various hypotheses about how the status differences matter,
we conjecture that all of them might be true, but that they apply to different situa-
tions. For example, in a setting where there is competition for hierarchical positions,
one could assume with Gould (2003) that most aggression occurs among actors with
ambiguous positions. Likewise, in a situation in which lower status actors depend on
higher ranking actors, such as in a workplace setting where the latter can exercise
power over the former, aggression may “ﬂow downward”. Conversely, the underdogs
may rebel against the oppressors, if given a chance to do so: that is, if the situation is
such that they do not have to fear further repression. In this case, aggression would
“ﬂows upward”. In the situation of blocked vehicles under study, however, we believe
that the status indicated by the cars of the two drivers mostly functions as a device for
social categorization, giving rise to the mechanisms of in-group favoritism. Hence, we
assume that sanctioning behavior “ﬂows outward”: that is, sanctioning behavior is
expressed more readily if the status between the two actors is different, independent
of the direction of the difference. Note, however, that the same pattern could also re-
sult if, for example, higher status drivers punish lower status drivers because they feel
more entitled to use the road, and, at the same time, the “underdogs” take the chance
to rebel because they can do so without fearing retaliation.
2 Methods
Experiment 1
We blocked cars at traffic lights using an experimental car and measured horn-
honking response times in a similar manner to Doob and Gross (1968). A pre-test
was conducted to practice the blocking method and test our ability to capture the rel-
evant information on our experimental subjects validly and reliably. Our experiment
was conducted on two consecutive Saturday mornings in spring 1995 at an intersec-
tion with relatively light traffic in Bern, Switzerland. On the ﬁrst Saturday we used
an experimental car indicating a high social status (a black 1995 Audi A6 2.6L), and
on the second a car indicating a low social status (a blue 1989 Volkswagen Golf C1
Mark III). Traffic conditions were similar on both mornings. As in other studies, the
use of this method reﬂects the presumption that the car driven by a subject is (to some
degree) assumed by the drivers of other cars to reﬂect his or her social status (Marsh
and Collett 1986 provide evidence that this is the case). It also assumes that other
subjects are able to perceive information such as the make of an automobile, which
seems reasonable since drivers appear to note a wide variety of information about
other drivers spontaneously (Knapper and Cropley 1980).
An experimental trial was initiated only when the experimental car could be
stopped as the ﬁrst car in a line formed at a red light, andwhen it was followed by just
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one car, whose driver’s behavior was being recorded.² After the light turned green,
the experimental car remained stopped until the driver in the car behind it honked.
The experimental car contained a driver and two visible observers, all male. One
of the observers measured the time between the light’s changing and the honking
response. Using the mirrors, the other observer noted some information about the
blocked subject, including the sex and estimated age of the driver, as well as the
make, model, and status indicated by the blocked vehicle (in terms of one of three
hierarchical categories based on the car’s make, model, and approximate age). If a
blocked subject did not respond within the twelve-second period during which the
light was green, the case was considered censored at t = 12. In total, 123 valid cases
were observed, approximately 60 on each of the mornings, of which 26 represented
censored measurements.
Experiment 2
In the second experiment, weblocked cars in a one-way street with relatively light traf-
ﬁc in the inner city of Zurich.We placed the experimental car approximately 30meters
down the road from the entry into the street, positioned slightly diagonally so that ap-
proaching vehicles could not pass and that the diver of the blocking car could be seen.
After conducting several pretests, our experimentwas carried out on a sunny Tuesday,
between 10:30 a.m. and 5:40 p.m., in summer 2005. We used two experimental cars,
one indicatinghigh social status (a dark silver 2005 BMW 530i limousine; selling price
64,000 CHF) and one indicating low social status (a silver 1995 VW Golf 1800 Rolling
Stones; selling price 24,000 CHF). Cars were switched about every 20 trials. We also
varied the sex of the driver in the blocking car, switching drivers about every 10 tri-
als. Since traffic conditions and temperature changed during the day, we control for
temperature and traffic density in the analyses below.³
An experimental trial was initiated when a vehicle entered the street after the
experimental car was in position. The experimental car remained stopped until the
blocked car (or one of the subsequent cars, if several vehicles entered the street)
honked. Each trail was taped by two video cameras, one hidden below a piece of
clothing in the back of the experimental car and one operated by a confederate hiding
in a hedge on the side of the street. Two further confederates, one on each side of
the street, took notes about the blocked car, its driver, and the horn honking reaction
using standardized forms (including information such as the time until the horn was
2 All trials were conducted at the same intersection between amain street and a side street. The trials
were conducted in the side street, alternating the direction between each trial.
3 Temperature data for Zurich (one measurement every 10 minutes) was obtained from MeteoSwiss
(FederalOfficeofMeteorology andClimatology). Informationonhourly trafficﬂow (numberof vehicles
counted by the traffic sensors in Zurich) was obtained from ASTRA (Federal Roads Office). We used
linear interpolation betweenmeasurements tomatch temperature and traffic density to the individual
trials.
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honked, the number of blocked vehicles, the sex and estimated age of the driver, and
the status indicated by the foremost blocked vehicle). All collected information was
validated and complemented based on an analysis of the videos later on. For exam-
ple, exact measurements of the horn-honking response times were obtained from the
videos (in a few cases, the honking was not audible on the video, in which case we
used the measurement taken in the ﬁeld; the correlation between the measurements
taken in the ﬁeld and the videos is r = 0.98). Based on stills from the videos, an au-
tomobile expert coded the exact make and model of the blocked car, its approximate
production year, and its selling price.
In the analyses belowwe exclude a handful of observations because, for example,
the approaching car turned into a parking spot instead of being blocked, or because
information on some key variables was missing or inconsistent (due to the failure of
the observers to take notes, or due to missing video recordings). We also exclude 10
observations because the blocked vehicle was a delivery van or motorcycle, for which
a status comparison to the experimental car is difficult. In total, 106 valid cases are
available for the analysis. In 10 cases, the honking response came from a successive
vehicle instead of the foremost blocked car (detailed data was collected only for the
foremost car). We treat these cases as censored in our analysis.
We use twomeasures for the status of the blocked vehicles: (a) a subjective classi-
ﬁcation in terms of one of three hierarchical categories similar to Experiment 1 (lower,
middle, higher), and (b) the estimated monetary value of the vehicle. The monetary
value is equal to the selling price after applying a yearly depreciation of 5%. There is a
clear relation between the twomeasures: the averagemonetary values are 16,497 CHF,
24,971 CHF, or 37,573 CHF for vehicles classiﬁed as lower, middle, or higher status.
Data analysis
Since there are censored response times, the techniques of event historymodeling are
themost appropriate statistical tools for analyzing the data (Diekmann et al. 1996:763).
We use the product-limit method to estimate survival curves as descriptive measures.
Multivariate analysis employs the semi-parametric Cox regression model (Cox 1972;
Diekmann and Mitter 1984). In the Cox model, the hazard rate r(t) of horn-honking
(i.e., the probability of a horn-honking event at time t, conditional on its not having
yet occurred) is modeled as the product of an unspeciﬁed baseline hazard rate and
the exponent of a linear function of the covariates. In the following analysis we will
report the exponents of the estimated coefficients, since they can be interpreted in a
straightforwardmanner asmultiplication effects on the hazard rate, that is, as hazard
ratios (effects greater than one imply an increase in the hazard rate and faster honk-
ing reactions; effects lower than one imply a decrease in the hazard rate and slower
honking reactions). The Cox regression assumes proportional hazards at each point
in time. The applicability of this assumption was tested, and deviation from it was
negligible for the models discussed below (see last row in Table 1).
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3 Results
Figure 1 shows the horn-honking survival functions from the two experiments. In Ex-
periment 1, the time-window in which a honking reaction could occur was restricted
to 12 seconds. About 80 percent of all blocked drivers honked within these 12 seconds
(i.e., the survival function drops down to about 20%). In Experiment 2, there was no
such restriction, as the blocking car remained stopped until the ﬁrst honking reac-
tion occurred (the maximum time recoded in our data is 60 seconds). In Figure 1, we
only display the survival curve for the ﬁrst 20 seconds, within which about 80%of the
blocked subjects honked. Overall, honking reactions occurred faster in Experiment 1
than in Experiment 2. The reason is that in Experiment 2, reaction time was measured
from when the blocked vehicle entered the street, whereas in Experiment 1, time was
measured from the moment the lights turned green, with the blocked vehicle already
in position behind the experimental car.
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
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Fig. 1: Horn-honking survival functions.
To test our hypothesis that honking reactions are affected by the status difference be-
tween the experimental car and the blocked vehicle, Table 1 displays the results of sev-
eral Cox regressions (for descriptive statistics, see Table 2 in the Appendix). InModel 1,
which is based on the data of Experiment 1, we see that a status difference between the
two vehicles accords with a signiﬁcant increase in the hazard rate of honking: a one-
point status difference increases the hazard rate by about 40%. The corresponding
results from Experiment 2 (Model 3) are very similar (showing a signiﬁcant increase in
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Tab. 1:Multivariate analysis of honking response times (z-values in brackets).
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Status Status Value
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Absolute difference in
status or valuea
1.42∗
(2.16)
1.45∗
(2.44)
2.40∗∗
(3.07)
Downward difference in
status or valuea
1.11
(0.46)
1.07
(0.34)
2.99∗
(2.50)
Upward difference in
status or valuea
1.90∗
(2.57)
2.02∗∗
(3.17)
2.11∗
(2.16)
Status of experimental
car (0 low, 1 high)
1.15
(0.67)
0.67
(−0.99)
0.85
(−0.71)
0.46∗
(−2.08)
0.52∗
(−2.23)
0.66
(−0.88)
Driver in experimental
car is female (0/1)
0.52∗∗
(−2.81)
0.53∗∗
(−2.69)
0.51∗∗
(−2.84)
0.50∗∗
(−2.91)
Driver in blocked car is
female (0/1)
0.64
(−1.64)
0.55∗
(−2.08)
1.61+
(1.95)
1.50+
(1.66)
1.50+
(1.67)
1.50+
(1.68)
Blocked driver aged 18
through 30 (0/1)
1.45
(1.27)
1.33
(0.97)
0.48∗
(−2.42)
0.47∗
(−2.47)
0.47∗
(−2.41)
0.47∗
(−2.40)
Blocked driver aged 56
or older (0/1)
1.72∗
(2.07)
1.78∗
(2.18)
1.46
(1.12)
1.44
(1.07)
1.27
(0.72)
1.31
(0.80)
Business vehicle (0/1) 2.38∗
(2.01)
2.05
(1.64)
2.28+
(1.94)
2.37∗
(2.00)
Temperature 1.13
(0.75)
1.24
(1.25)
1.18
(0.99)
1.16
(0.91)
Traffic density 1.09
(1.05)
1.12
(1.37)
1.10
(1.16)
1.10
(1.17)
Direction of entry into
road (0 left, 1 right)
2.10∗∗
(2.65)
2.14∗∗
(2.72)
2.15∗∗
(2.74)
2.14∗∗
(2.73)
Number of trials (events) 123(97) 123(97) 106(96) 106(96) 106(96) 106(96)
Likelihood ratio χ2 (df ) 13.5(5)∗ 16.0(6)∗ 26.4(10)∗∗ 31.0(11)∗∗ 29.8(10)∗∗∗ 30.2(11)∗∗
Proportional-hazards
test (p-value)
0.784 0.800 0.414 0.476 0.640 0.728
Notes: Displayed are hazard ratios from proportional-hazards models (Cox regressions). Reference
age group: drivers aged 31 through 55.
a Difference in status (0: same level, 1: low or high vs. middle, 2: low vs. high) (models 1–4) or
difference in log value (models 5/6) between blocked vehicle and blocking vehicle. The difference is
downward (upward) if the status/value of the blocked vehicle is higher (lower) than the status/value
of the blocking vehicle.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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the hazard rate of about 45% for a one-point status difference).⁴ Furthermore, if the
status difference is measured in terms of the difference in monetary value between
the vehicles, we see a very clear and statistically signiﬁcant effect (Model 5). Since we
use a logarithmic speciﬁcation, the coefficient of 2.40 can be interpreted as about a
2.40ln(2) − 1 = 83% increase in the hazard rate if the higher status vehicle is worth
about twice as much as the lower status vehicle, compared to a situation in which the
value of both vehicles is the same.
Overall, these results provide clear evidence for the “difference hypothesis” (the
hypothesis that sanctioning is exerted more readily if there is a status difference be-
tween the two actors). Also note that the above models ﬁt the data signiﬁcantly better
thanmodels inwhich the status ormonetary value of the blocked vehicle is introduced
as is, without taking differences to the status of the experimental car (not shown). To
put it another way, the actors’ status levels per se do not explain the patterns found in
our data; it is the combination of status between the two actors that matters.
Against the backdrop of the literature discussed above, an interesting question
is whether the effects work the same in both directions, or whether, for example, ag-
gression mainly “ﬂows downward”. In Models 2, 4, and 6, the effects of the status dif-
ference are separated into an effect of a downward difference (the blocked driver has
a higher status than the blocker) and an effect of an upward difference (the blocked
driver has a lower status than the blocker). The results from Model 2 (Experiment 1)
and Model 4 (Experiment 2) suggest that status matters when a lower status car is
blocked by a higher status car, but not in the reverse case. These results suggest that
aggression “ﬂows upward”, but the results are not fully conclusive, as the difference
in effects of a downward difference and an upward difference is not statistically signif-
icant in Model 2 (p = 0.119) and only mildly signiﬁcant in Model 4 (p = 0.034). It is
thus not entirely clear whether the distinction between downward and upward differ-
ences reallymatters. Furthermore,Model 6, inwhich status ismeasured in terms of the
monetary value of the vehicles, does not provide support for such a distinction. Here,
both effects are statistically signiﬁcant, and the effect of a downward difference is in
fact somewhat stronger (although the difference between the two effects is far from
being statistically signiﬁcant: p = 0.515). The results from Model 6 thus suggest that
the relationship between peer-punishment and status is similar in both situations.
For a better impression of the size of the discussed effects, Figure 2 displays the
predicted survival curves from Models 2, 4, and 6 for different combinations of the
4 The status difference variable in these models can take on three values: 0 (same status category),
1 (difference between a middle status reactor and a lower or higher status experimental car), and 2
(difference between a higher status reactor and a lower status experimental car, or vice versa). Since
the null hypothesis of a linear effect of the status difference (i.e., the effect of a one-point status differ-
ence is exactly half of the effect of a two-point status difference) cannot be rejected (p-value of 0.893
for Model 1 and 0.601 for Model 3), we refrain from using a more complex speciﬁcation with separate
effects for the two levels of status difference.
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Fig. 2: Predicted survival functions by status or value difference fromModels 2, 4, and 6.
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status of the experimental vehicle and the status of the blocked driver (with average
values for the control variables). In the case ofModel 2 (upper subgraphs) andModel 4
(middle subgraphs), the scenarios reﬂect the possible combinations of the categorical
status variable (small difference: same category; medium difference: middle vs. low
or high; large difference: low vs. high). In the case of Model 6 (lower subgraphs), the
scenarios are determined by relative differences in monetary value (small difference:
same value; medium difference: the value of one of the vehicles is 50% higher than
the value of the other vehicle; large difference: one of the vehicles is worth twice as
much as the other; these scenarios were chosen in accordance with the approximate
differences in average vehicle values between the three status groups, for which see
above). The subgraphs on the left illustrate the effect of a (downward) status differ-
ence in case of the lower status experimental car; the subgraphs on the right show
the effect of an (upward) status difference in case of the upper status experimental
car. In all cases larger status differences lead to lower survival curves: the larger the
status difference, themore drivers honk their hornwithin a given timespan. In the up-
per two subgraphs on the left, the differences between the curves are negligible (and
not statistically signiﬁcant). In the other cases, however, the differences are substan-
tial. For example, in Experiment 2, only about 20% honk within the ﬁrst 10 seconds
when both vehicles belong to the higher status class, but more than 60% of lower
class drivers honk in the same timespan if they are blocked by a higher class vehicle
(middle subgraph on the right). Correspondingly, the median response time (the time
until 50% of the cars honked) is almost 20 seconds in the former case, but only 8 sec-
onds in the later. For Experiment 1, the effects of an upward status difference are of
similar magnitude (see the upper right subgraph). If status is measured in terms of
vehicle value, the effects are substantial in both directions (see lower subgraphs), but
the magnitude of the effects is somewhat smaller than above. Median response times
for large and small differences were about 10 and 15 seconds in the case of the low
status blocker, and about 14 and 20 seconds in the case of the high status blocker.
Note that the curves in the right subgraphs tend to be higher than the curves in
the left subgraphs. This means that, controlling for status difference, an upper status
experimental car elicited a somewhat slower honking responses than a lower status
car. The corresponding coefficients (reﬂecting the difference between the solid lines
on the left and on the right) point in the same direction in all three models, but only
inModel 4 is the coefficient statistically signiﬁcant. The evidence for a more generous
treatment of high-status norm violators is therefore only weak.
With respect to the control variables, we ﬁnd a clear effect of the sex of the driver
of the experimental car. Hazard rates were substantially lower if the driver was female
and not male (Models 4–6, Experiment 2 only; in Experiment 1 the driver was always
male). With respect to the sex of the blocked driver, we found inconsistent results be-
tween the two experiments. In Experiment 1, females tended to have lower hazard
rates than males, but in Experiment 2, females tended to show faster honking reac-
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tions (the effects, however, were only marginally signiﬁcant).⁵ One may suspect that
the combination of the genders of the two drivers matters. Adding an interaction term
to the models of Experiment 2 did reveal a diminishing effect if both drivers were fe-
male, but the difference was far from being statistically signiﬁcant (p-values between
0.3 and 0.4, depending on the model). In terms of the age of the blocked drivers, the
results were also inconsistent between the experiments. Whereas older drivers in Ex-
periment 1 had signiﬁcantly higher hazard rates than middle-aged drivers, the corre-
sponding effect was smaller and not signiﬁcant in Experiment 2 (although pointing in
the samedirection). Furthermore, youngdrivers in Experiment 1 tended to havehigher
hazard rates (although this was not statistically signiﬁcant), whereas younger drivers
in Experiment 2 had signiﬁcantly lower hazard rates than middle-aged drivers. For
Experiment 2, for whichmore control variables are available, we foundmild evidence
for faster honking reactions in drivers of business vehicles. Temperature and traffic
density had effects in the expected direction, but were not statistically signiﬁcant. A
clear effect, however, was found for the direction from which the blocked car entered
the street. This is a purely technical effect related to the way in which we determined
the starting point for measuring the honking response times. We also evaluated the
effects of some further control variables, such as the color of the blocked car, without
ﬁnding any meaningful results (not shown).⁶
5 Results from other studies on the relative willingness of males and females to sound their car horns
are also ambiguous. While Doob and Gross (1968), Shinar (1998:149–150), and Shinar and Compton
(2004) report signiﬁcantly fewer honking responses by female drivers, the effect has not been sig-
niﬁcant in several replications of the horn-honking experiment (Chase and Mills 1973; Deaux 1971;
Diekmann et al. 1996; Ellison et al. 1995; Forgas 1976; Kenrick and MacFarlane 1986; Shinar 1998:151–
156; Turner, Layton, and Simons 1975), although the results of most of these studies showed longer
latencies for women. Hennessey and Wiesenthal (1999) ﬁnd no differences between men and women
in behaviors such as honking, but suggest in a later article (2001) that a more distinct difference be-
tween men and women may be expected in the case of “driver violence”, that is, more severe forms
of behavior, such as chasing other drivers or vandalizing vehicles. These results ﬁt well with those
reported for aggression in general. A meta-analysis by Bettencourt and Miller (1996) suggests that the
largest differences between male and female aggression occur either in conditions in which there is
no provocation, or when the aggression is expressed in physical form.
6 One variable, whether successive vehicles were present behind the blocked car, did have a signif-
icant effect (and including this variable also rendered the effect of traffic density signiﬁcant). One
could expect that the presence of successive vehicles is an additional stressor putting pressure on the
blocked car, leading to faster honking reactions. Oddly, however, the effect was negative. We did not
include this effect in our models because the result is an artifact of how the variable was measured.
The longer a blocked driver refrained from honking, the higher the chance that additional vehicles
appeared in the street (this also explains the increased effect of traffic density, as more cars appear
in a given timespan if traffic density is high). Because the variable only measures whether additional
vehicles were present, but not the exact times at which they appeared, the variable is endogenous to
the honking behavior of the blocked driver. To estimate the effect of additional vehicles consistently,
their appearance would have to be introduced in terms of a time-varying covariate.
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4 Conclusions
The ﬁndings reported in this paper provide evidence that the disparity in social status
between two actors has a positive effect on the degree of sanctioning behavior that is
expressedduring their interaction. These resultswereobtained in two road-trafficﬁeld
experiments, during which subjects’ behavior was observed after their cars had been
blocked by another car. Speciﬁcally, latencies in horn-honking responses were signif-
icantly higher in cases where the driver of a car was blocked by an experimental car
of similar status than in cases where it was blocked by a car of quite different status.
These results support our hypothesis. For the question of whether status differences
operate in the same way irrespective of the direction of the difference (the punisher’s
statusbeinghigher than thenormviolator’s status, or vice versa), orwhether sanction-
ing “ﬂows downward” as suggested by literature on aggressive behavior, our ﬁndings
are ambiguous. The results for one of our status measures suggests that sanctioning
mainly “ﬂows upward”, counter to the expectation from the literature. However, the
statistical evidence for a difference in the effect depending on direction is not partic-
ularly strong. Moreover, clearly symmetric effects were found for our second status
measure.
Despite the fact that our resultswere obtainedwith a fewdeviations fromprevious
experimental designs, theymay reﬂect somethingmore than the choice of a particular
methodology, especially since similar results were obtained byDiekmann et al. (1996).
The experimental car used to block the intersection by Diekmann et al. was classiﬁed
as “lower middle class”, which was also the class of blocked drivers who showed the
lowest level of horn-honking in their experiment. The level of horn-honking increased
monotonically for higher status classes, and also for the lower status class: that is,
the larger the status difference, the higher the level of horn-honking. Whether similar
social status may have contributed to the effects detailed in other previous studies is
difficult to assess, since the status of the blocked carwas not reported in those studies.
However, according to the status-similarity hypothesis, the results of the classic horn-
honkingexperimentsdescribed in the introduction shoulddependon the composition
of the sample of blocked subjects. If there are, for example, predominantly high-status
subjects in the sample, onewould expect a lower-status blocking vehicle to elicitmore
aggressive responses than a higher-status car, as observed by Doob and Gross (1968)
and Deaux (1971). If, on the other hand, the reactors are drivers of mostly low-status
cars, one would expect more aggressive responses toward a higher-status blocking
vehicle than to a lower-status blocking vehicle, as reported by Chase andMills (1973).
The situation we study can be seen as a social dilemma in the sense that individ-
ual behavior (blocking the road) has negative externalities for the public (impediment
of traffic ﬂow), and that the blocking car violates a social norm (to keep the road clear
if possible). Most likely, however, there is no second-order dilemmawith respect to the
enforcement of norm compliance, asmost of the externalities are imposed on a single
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actor (the blocked driver). It is reasonable to assume that the costs of sanctioning are
much lower than the beneﬁts, even though there may be a small chance that the norm
violator will engage in retaliatory behavior rather thanmove the car. Nonetheless, our
study is a valuable contribution to the literature on peer-punishment, as it shows how
punishing behavior depends on the social status of the actors. We are, however, skep-
tical about whether our results can be applied to situations in which status is more
than a mere token of social categorization. As discussed in the introduction, differ-
ent results may, for example, be expected in a situation characterized by competition
for status positions, or in a situation where an explicit power relationship exists be-
tween actors of different status. How status relates to sanctioning in different types of
situations is an interesting question to be studied in future research.
Appendix
Tab. 2: Descriptive statistics of the predictors.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Status of blocker (0 low, 1 high) 0.496 0.481
Driver in blocking car is female (0/1) 0.528
Status of blocked vehicle
– low 0.252 0.368
– middle 0.553 0.387
– high 0.195 0.245
Absolute difference in status (0–2) 0.976 0.671 0.972 0.786
Downward difference in status (0–2) 0.463 0.669 0.443 0.705
Upward difference in status (0–2) 0.512 0.694 0.528 0.771
Natural logarithm of value of blocked vehicle
(selling price minus 5% depreciation per year)
10.02 0.451
Absolute difference in log value 0.792 0.497
Downward difference in log value 0.259 0.363
Upward difference in log value 0.533 0.627
Female blocked driver (0/1) 0.236 0.349
Estimated age of blocked driver
– 18 through 30 0.138 0.406
– 31 through 55 0.650 0.462
– 56 or older 0.211 0.132
Business vehicle (0/1) 0.075
Temperature (in degree Celsius) 28.19 0.984
Traffic density (in 1000 vehicles per hour) 11.64 2.214
Direction of entry into road (0 left, 1 right) 0.764
Number of observations 123 106
Brought to you by | Universitätsbibliothek Bern
Authenticated | ben.jann@soz.unibe.ch
Download Date | 11/6/17 11:35 AM
274 | Ben Jann and Elisabeth Coutts
Bibliography
[1] Allan, Steven, and Paul Gilbert. 2002. “Anger and anger expression in relation to perceptions
of social rank, entrapment and depressive symptoms.” Personality and Individual Differences
32(3):551–565.
[2] Anderson, Cameron, and Jennifer L. Berdahl. 2002. “The experience of power: Examining the
effects of power on approach and inhibition tendencies.” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 83(6):1362–1377.
[3] Anderson, Craig A., and Brad J. Bushman. 2002. “Human aggression.” Annual Review of Psy-
chology 53:27–51.
[4] Baron, Robert A. 1976. “The reduction of human aggression: A ﬁeld study of the inﬂuence of
incompatible reactions.” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 6(3):260–274.
[5] Barroso, F. G., C. L. Alados, and J. Boza. 2000. “Social hierarchy in the domestic goat: effect
on food habits and production.” Applied Animal Behaviour Science 69(1):35–53.
[6] Bettencourt, B. Ann, and Norman Miller. 1996. “Gender differences in aggression as a function
of provocation: A meta-analysis.” Psychological Bulletin 119(3):422–447.
[7] Billig, Michael, and Henri Tajfel. 1973. “Social categorization and similarity in intergroup be-
haviour.” European Journal of Social Psychology 3(1):9–26.
[8] Brewer, Marilynn B. 1979. “In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive-
motivational analysis.” Psychological Bulletin 86(2):307–324.
[9] Brewer, Marilynn B., and Roderick M. Kramer. 1985. “The psychology of intergroup attitudes
and behavior.” Annual Review of Psychology 36:219–243.
[10] Burger, Jerry M., and Harris M. Cooper. 1979. “The desirability of control.” Motivation and
Emotion 3(4):381–393.
[11] Chase, Lawrence J., and Norbert H. Mills. 1973. “Status of frustrator as a facilitator of aggres-
sion: A brief note.” The Journal of Psychology 84(2):225–226.
[12] Clark, Candace. 1990. “Emotions and micropolitics in everyday life: Some patterns and para-
doxes of ‘place’.” Pp. 505–533 in Research agendas in the sociology of emotions, edited by
T. D. Kemper. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
[13] Conway, Michael R., Roberto DiFazio, and Shari Mayman. 1999. “Judging others’ emotions as
a function of others’ status.” Social Psychology Quarterly 62(3):291–305.
[14] Cox, David R. 1972. “Regression models and life-tables.” Journal of the Royal Statistical Soci-
ety, Series B 34:187–220.
[15] Deaux, Kay K. 1971. “Honking at the intersection: A replication and extension.” The Journal of
Social Psychology 84(1):159–160.
[16] Deffenbacher, Jerry L., Rebekah S. Lynch, Eugene R. Oetting, and David A. Yingling. 2001.
“Driving anger: correlates and a test of state-trait theory.” Personality and Individual Differ-
ences 31(8):1321–1331.
[17] Deffenbacher, Jerry L., Eugene R. Oetting, and Rebekah S. Lynch. 1994. “Development of a
driving anger scale.” Psychological Reports 74(1):83–91.
[18] Diekmann, Andreas, Monika Jungbauer-Gans, Heinz Krassnig, and Sigrid Lorenz. 1996. “Social
status and aggression: A ﬁeld study analyzed by survival analysis.” Journal of Social Psychol-
ogy 136(6):761–768.
[19] Diekmann, Andreas, and Peter Mitter. 1984.Methoden zur Analyse von Zeitverläufen. Anwen-
dungen stochastischer Prozesse bei der Untersuchung von Ereignisdaten. Stuttgart: B. G.
Teubner.
[20] Doob, Anthony N., and Alan E. Gross. 1968. “Status of frustrator as an inhibitor of horn-
honking responses.” The Journal of Social Psychology 76(2):213–218.
Brought to you by | Universitätsbibliothek Bern
Authenticated | ben.jann@soz.unibe.ch
Download Date | 11/6/17 11:35 AM
Social Status and Peer-Punishment: Findings from Two Road Traffic Field Experiments | 275
[21] Ellison, Patricia A., John M. Govern, Herbert L. Petri, and Michael H. Figler. 1995. “Anonymity
and aggressive driving behavior: A ﬁeld study.” Journal of Social Behavior and Personality
10(1):265–272.
[22] Forgas, Joseph P. 1976. “An unobtrusive study of reactions to national stereotypes in four
European countries.” The Journal of Social Psychology 99(1):37–42.
[23] Gould, Roger V. 2003. Collision of Wills: How ambiguity about social rank breeds conﬂict.
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
[24] Galinsky, Adam D., Deborah H. Gruenfeld, and Joe C. Magee. 2003. “From power to action.”
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85(3):453–466.
[25] Haukkala, Ari. 2002. “Socio-economic differences in hostility measures: A population based
study.” Psychology and Health 17(2):191–202.
[26] Hecht, Marvin A., and Marianne LaFrance. 1988. “License or obligation to smile: The effect of
power and gender on amount and type of smiling.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
24(12):1326–1336.
[27] Hennessy, Dwight A., and David L. Wiesenthal. 1997. “The relationship between traffic conges-
tion, driver stress and direct versus indirect coping behaviours.” Ergonomics 40(3):348–361.
[28] Hennessy, Dwight A., and David L. Wiesenthal. 1999. “Traffic congestion, driver stress, and
driver aggression.” Aggressive Behavior 25(6):409–423.
[29] Hennessy, Dwight A., and David L. Wiesenthal. 2001. “Gender, driver aggression, and driver
violence: An applied evaluation.” Sex Roles 44(11–12):661–676.
[30] Jann, Ben, Stephan Suhner, and Renato Marioni. 1995. Sozialer Status und “Hupzeiten”. Ergeb-
nisse aus einem Feldexperiment. University of Bern: Mimeo.
[31] Jann, Ben. 2009. “Sozialer Status und Hup-Verhalten. Ein Feldexperiment zum Zusammenhang
zwischen Status und Aggression im Strassenverkehr.” Pp. 397–410 in Klein aber fein! Quan-
titative empirische Sozialforschung mit kleinen Fallzahlen, edited by P. Kriwy, and C. Gross.
Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag.
[32] Keltner, Dacher, Deborah H. Gruenfeld, and Cameron Anderson. 2003. “Power, approach, and
inhibition.” Psychological Review 110(2):265–284.
[33] Kemper, Theodore D. 1978. A social interaction theory of emotions. New York: Wiley.
[34] Kemper, Theodore D. 1987. “Howmany emotions are there? Wedding the social and the auto-
nomic components.” American Journal of Sociology 93(2):263–289.
[35] Kenrick, Douglas T., and Steven W. MacFarlane. 1986. “Ambient temperature and horn honk-
ing: A ﬁeld study of the heat/aggression relationship.” Environment and Behavior 18(2):179–
191.
[36] Knapper, Christopher K., and Arthur J. Cropley. 1980. “Interpersonal factors in driving.” Inter-
national Review of Applied Psychology 29(4):415–438.
[37] Kramer, Roderick M., and Marilynn B. Brewer. 1986. “Social group identity and the emergence
of cooperation in resource conservation dilemmas.” Pp. 205–234 in Experimental social dilem-
mas, edited by H. A. M. Wilke, D. M. Messick, and C. G. Rutte. Frankfurt amMain: Peter Lang.
[38] Kuppens, Peter, Iven Van Mechelen, and Michel Meulders. 2004. “Every cloud has a silver
lining: Interpersonal and individual differences determinants of anger-related behaviors.”
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30(12):1550–1564.
[39] Lajunen, Timo, and Dianne Parker. 2001. “Are aggressive people aggressive drivers? A study
of the relationship between self-reported general aggressiveness, driver anger and aggressive
driving.” Accident Analysis and Prevention 33(2):243–255.
[40] Lajunen, Timo, Dianne Parker, and Stephen G. Stradling. 1998. “Dimensions of driver anger,
aggressive and highway code violations and their mediation by safety orientation in UK
drivers.” Transportation Research Part F 1:107–121.
Brought to you by | Universitätsbibliothek Bern
Authenticated | ben.jann@soz.unibe.ch
Download Date | 11/6/17 11:35 AM
276 | Ben Jann and Elisabeth Coutts
[41] Lawton, Rebecca, and Amanda Nutter. 2002. “A comparison of reported levels and expression
of anger in everyday and driving situations.” British Journal of Psychology 93(3):407–423.
[42] Lively, Kathryn J. 2000. “Reciprocal emotion management: Working together to maintain
stratiﬁcation.” Work and Occupations 27(1):32–63.
[43] Lovaglia, Michael J., and Jeffrey A. Houser. 1996. “Emotional reactions and status in groups.”
American Sociological Review 61(5):869–883.
[44] Marsh, Peter, and Peter Collett. 1986. Driving passion: The psychology of the car. London:
Jonathan Cape.
[45] McGarva, Andrew R., and Michelle Steiner. 2000. “Provoked driver aggression and status:
A ﬁeld study.” Transportation Research Part F 3:167–179.
[46] McKinnon, Neil J. 1994. Symbolic interactionism as affect control. Albany, NY: State University
of New York Press.
[47] Mummendey, Amélle, and Hans-Joachim Schreiber. 1983. “Better or just different? Positive so-
cial identity by discrimination against, or by differentiation from outgroups.” European Journal
of Social Psychology 13(4):389–397.
[48] Novaco, RaymondW. 1991. “Aggression on Roadways.” Pp. 253–326 in Targets of Violence and
Aggression, edited by R. Baenninger. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers.
[49] Parker, Dianne, Timo Lajunen, and Heikki Summala. 2002. “Anger and aggression among
drivers in three European countries.” Accident Analysis and Prevention 34(2):229–235.
[50] Pitkänen, Lea. 1973. “An aggression machine: II. Interindividual differences in the aggressive
defence responses aroused by varying stimulus conditions.” Scandinavian Journal of Psychol-
ogy 14(2):65–74.
[51] Ramirez, J. Martin, Carmen Santisteban, Takehiro Fujihara, and Stephanie Van Goozen. 2002.
“Differences between experience of anger and readiness to angry action: A study of Japanese
and Spanish students.” Aggressive Behavior 28(6):429–438.
[52] Ridgeway, Cecilia, and Cathryn Johnson. 1990. “What is the relationship between socioemo-
tional behavior and status in task groups?” American Journal of Sociology 95(5):1189–1212.
[53] Robinson, W. Peter. 1996. Social groups and identities. Developing the legacy of Henri Tajfel.
Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.
[54] Rothe, Jörg, and Heiko Schmiedeskamp. 2006. Aggressionsverhalten im Strassenverkehr:
Analyse der Hupverzögerung von blockierten Autos. ETH Zurich: Mimeo.
[55] Schieman, Scott. 2003. “Socioeconomic status and the frequency of anger across the life
course.” Sociological Perspectives 46(2):207–222.
[56] Shinar, David. 1998. “Aggressive driving: The contribution of the drivers and the situation.”
Transportation Research Part F 1:137–160.
[57] Shinar, David, and Richard Compton. 2004. “Aggressive driving: an observational study of
driver, vehicle, and situational variables.” Accident Analysis and Prevention 36(3):429–437.
[58] Sloan, Melissa M. 2004. “The effects of occupational characteristics on the experience and
expression of anger in the workplace.”Work and Occupations 31(1):38–72.
[59] Smith-Lovin, Lynn. 1990. “Emotion as the conﬁrmation and disconﬁrmation of identity: An
affect control model.” Pp. 238–270 in Research agendas in the sociology of emotions, edited
by T. D. Kemper. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
[60] Tajfel, Henri. 1978. Differentiation between social groups. Studies in the social psychology of
intergroup relations. London: Academic Press.
[61] Tajfel, Henri. 1982a. “Social psychology of intergroup relations.” Annual Review of Psychology
33:1–39.
[62] Tajfel, Henri. 1982b. Social identity and intergroup relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Brought to you by | Universitätsbibliothek Bern
Authenticated | ben.jann@soz.unibe.ch
Download Date | 11/6/17 11:35 AM
Social Status and Peer-Punishment: Findings from Two Road Traffic Field Experiments | 277
[63] Tajfel, Henri, Michael G. Billig, R. P. Bundy, and Claude Flament. 1971. “Social Categorization
and intergroup behaviour.” European Journal of Social Psychology 1(2):149–177.
[64] Taubman-Ben-Ari, Orit, Mario Mikulincer, and Omri Gillath. 2004. “The multidimensional
driving style inventory: Scale construction and validation.” Accident Analysis and Prevention
36:323–332.
[65] Tiedens, Larissa Z. 2001. “Anger and advancement versus sadness and subjugation: The effect
of negative emotion expressions on social status conferral.” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 80(1):86–94.
[66] Tiedens, Larissa Z., Phoebe C. Ellsworth, and Batja Mesquita. 2000. “Stereotypes about senti-
ments and status: Emotional expectations for high- and low-status group members.” Personal-
ity and Social Psychology Bulletin 26(5):560–574.
[67] Turner, Charles W., John F. Layton, and Lynn S. Simons. 1975. “Naturalistic studies of aggres-
sive behavior: Aggressive stimuli, victim visibility, and horn honking.” Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 31(6):1098–1107.
[68] Turner, John C., Rupert J. Brown, and Henri Tajfel, 1979. “Social comparison and group interest
in ingroup favouritism.” European Journal of Social Psychology 9(2):187–204.
[69] Verona, Edelyn, Christopher J. Patrick, and Alan R. Lang. 2002. “A direct assessment of the role
of state and trait negative emotion in aggressive behavior.” Journal of Abnormal Psychology
111(2):249–258.
[70] Yagil, Dana. 2001. “Interpersonal antecedents of drivers’ aggression.” Transportation Research
Part F 4:119–131.
[71] Yazawa, Hisashi. 2004. “Effects of inferred social status and a beginning driver’s sticker upon
aggression of drivers in Japan.” Psychological Reports 94(3):1215–1220.
Brought to you by | Universitätsbibliothek Bern
Authenticated | ben.jann@soz.unibe.ch
Download Date | 11/6/17 11:35 AM
Brought to you by | Universitätsbibliothek Bern
Authenticated | ben.jann@soz.unibe.ch
Download Date | 11/6/17 11:35 AM
